Abstract: Prices for emission allowances in Europe's Emissions Trading System (ETS) have remained low for many years. This fact has given rise to controversies on whether there is a need for a fundamental reform of the ETS. Potential reform proposals include the introduction of a price floor for certificates and a market stability reserve (MSR), which is a rule-based mechanism to steering the market volume of allowances and the preferred approach of the European Commission. With the introduction of the MRS, the Commission aims at increasing and stabilizing certificate prices in the medium-and long-term. In this article, we alternatively recommend retaining the ETS as it is, rather than supplementing it by introducing a minimum price floor or a market stability reserve. Instead, mistakes from the past should be corrected by a single intervention: the final elimination of those 900 million allowances that were taken out of the market in 2014, but would again emerge in the market in 2019 and 2020 via backloading.
Introduction
The global number of emissions trading systems steadily increases. Ten years after launching the emissions trading scheme in the European Union (EU) in 2005, the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP, 2015) currently counts 17 such systems on four continents.
1 These regions account for 40% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Just recently, at the beginning of 2015, South Korea implemented a nation-wide ETS, while China foresees the introduction of a nation-wide system for 2016.
The European Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the central instrument to reduce
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in Europe. About 45% of the EU-wide GHG emissions are covered by this scheme (EC, 2013) . With the help of the ETS, the European Commission aims at reducing carbon dioxide ( ) emissions by 20% until 2020 and by 30% until 2030 relative to the 1990 level. To this end, the EU-wide maximum of emissions covered by the ETS, the so-called cap, is annually reduced by 1.74% between 2013 and 2020 (EP, 2010 ; from 2021 onwards the cap shall be decreased by 2.2% per year (CEU, 2014 ).
Compared to the price peak of about 30€ that was reached in April 2006, allowance prices have remained low for years, ranging between 3 and 9€ in the period from January 2012 to January 2015 ( Figure 1 ). This fact sparked controversial discussions about this climate protection instrument. Some argue that the design of the ETS is not effective in mitigating climate change when allowance prices are low, and therefore needs reforming.
These low prices are the consequence of large amounts of excess allowances. In fact, the number of excess allowances amounted to two billion at the beginning of the third trading phase in 2013 (EC, 2015) . This surplus arose from the large difference between allocated allowances (supply) and verified emissions (demand) Since this intervention only temporarily limits the supply of allowances, but does not solve the structural problem of both excess allowances and low prices, the European
Commission recently decided to introduce a so-called market stability reserve (MRS), with its 1 Apart from the European Emissions Trading System, there are 16 trading schemes that are implemented in the following countries: Canada (Québec Cap-and-Trade System), China (Beijing, Chongqing, Guandong, Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianj), Japan (Saitama Target Setting Emissions Trading System and Tokyo Cap-andTrade Program), Kazakhstan (KAZ ETS), Korea (Korea Trading Scheme), New Zealand (NZ ETS), Switzerland (Swiss ETS), USA (California Cap-and-Trade Program and RGGI) (ICAP, 2015) .
3 introduction being foreseen for 2019. The core of the MRS is a rule-based mechanism that automatically steers the amount of circulating allowances by withdrawing and storing them in a reserve when the number of excess allowances exceeds an upper limit. Conversely, allowances are returned to the market when the number of excess allowances falls below a lower limit. With the help of the MSR, the Commission hopes to stabilize allowance prices on a higher level than currently observed. Source: EEX (2015) Alternative reform proposals include the implementation of price floors, which is supported by the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU, 2011:255) , and a price corridor for allowances (Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Wood and Jotzo, 2011) . Specifically, limiting the price volatility at the lower end is expected to lead to a minimum level of security for investments in abatement technologies (acatech et al., 2015:19; Grüll and Taschini, 2011) .
Based on a theoretical discussion on the relative merits of alternative reform proposals, this article recommends retaining the ETS as it is, rather than supplementing it by introducing a minimum price floor or a market stability reserve. With respect to the market stability reserve, we argue that this instrument is not sufficient to increase allowance prices markedly in the short run. Although price floors and corridors are frequently asserted to be more effective alternatives, we demonstrate why the implementation of these instruments is not desirable either.
In the subsequent section, we describe the basic principles of the ETS, as well as the key reasons for the large number of excess allowances, which ultimately led to the controversial debate about this climate protection instrument. Section 3 presents the concept of the market stability reserve and the design proposed by the Commission to tackle the huge 
Reasons for the Surplus of Allowances
According to economic theory, certificate trading is a cost-efficient instrument to achieve a fixed environmental target in the short run (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Bonus, 1998 schemes that overlap with the ETS. In Germany, for instance, the generation of -free electricity, which is promoted by fixed feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy sources (RES), leads to a decreased demand for emission allowances in the German power sector (characterized in Figure 2 by a shift of the demand curve from to ).
Consequently, the allowance price drops from to , so that market participants of other sectors and countries can purchase allowances at lower prices. For instance, in their empirical analysis, Koch et al. (2014:681) find certificate price elasticity estimates of wind and solar electricity production falling between -0.11 and -0.15. As a result, more will be emitted outside the German power sector than without promoting RES in Germany, as companies refrain from investing in abatement technologies due to reduced allowance prices.
In effect, owing to the coexistence with the ETS, the promotion of RES does not reduce Yet, the offsets resulting from already approved projects can still be used in the ETS, because it is allowed to transfer excess allowances from the second to the third trading phase (banking). Therefore, the Öko-Institut (2013), as well as Neuhoff and Schopp (2013), ascribe the major part of the two billion excess allowances observed at the beginning of the third trading phase to the huge number of available CERs and ERUs. According to the Öko-Institut (2013), these offsets are responsible for 1.5 billion excess allowances; the remaining surplus may be attributed to the aftermath of the economic crisis in the late 2010s.
The Market Stability Reserve (MSR)
According to critics, the massive surplus of allowances and the resulting lack of scarcity signals do not lead to sufficient investments in carbon-extensive technologies. To spur investment incentives, several reform proposals have been suggested, among others the introduction of a market stability reserve (EC, 2014b), on which the EU institutions (Commission, Council, and Parliament) are expected to decide upon in 2015. This rule-based mechanism automatically steers the annual amount of allowances to be auctioned.
With the MSR, the Commission pursues two main objectives: first, reducing the high amount of excess allowances in the short term and, second, stabilizing allowance prices in the long term. To this end, an independent institution is supposed to determine the accumulated amount of allowances once a year. If at the end of year t the number of allowances exceeds the upper limit (833 million according to the EC proposal), the volume of auctioned allowances will be reduced by 12%, but at least by 100 million, in January of year t+2 and will be transferred to the reserve (Figure 3) . Thus, this mechanism could prove effective only with a time lag of up to one year. 5 If, on the other hand, the accumulated surplus is below the 3 According to the EU Linking Directive, Germany may use up to 22% of the allowances resulting from international projects. Thus, during the third trading phase, German operators can acquire about 450 million offsets arising from realizing CDM and JI measures. 4 The major part (58%) of the CERs used in the ETS originates from PFC projects (abatement costs: about 50 ct/t ), while another 24% originates from similar projects (abatement costs about 1 EUR/t ) (Agora Energiewende, 2015) . The climatic impact of both PFC and is by far much higher than that of , but they can be destructed at very low costs. While this procedure is legally prescribed in developed countries, the destruction was realized in CDM measures in China, India, South Korea and Mexico, to name but a few developing countries. Therefore, the resulting, inexpensive allowances are controversially discussed. 5 Actually, the time lag is shorter, because the verified emissions would be published in May of year t+1 (Gibis et al., 2015:29) . 
Quantity-versus Price-Based Instruments
The debate on whether emissions should be abated by either price-based interventions (e.g. taxes) or quantity-based instruments (e.g. trading schemes) has been going on for decades.
Martin Weitzman (1974) formalized this discussion in his seminal paper "Prices vs.
Quantities". According to the so-called Weitzman-Theorem, under perfect information, price and quantity-based instruments yield the same optimum of emission abatement, regardless of whether the price or the quantity is fixed. Indeed, if the shapes of the marginal benefit curve ( ) and marginal cost curve ( ) were to be known, either the emissions cap * or the tax rate * could be set ( Figure 5 ) and both alternatives would provide the same optimal pricequantity combination.
Yet, if the shapes of and are unknown -as it is the case in reality -priceand quantity-based instruments generally yield divergent outcomes. If emission caps and tax rates are set on the basis of expected marginal costs, , rather than the actual marginal cost curve, , the comparative advantage of either instrument, as well as the corresponding welfare losses, depend on the slopes of the curves at their intersection. This is the central insight of the Weitzman-Theorem. reductions over several decades. The reason for this claim is that limiting emissions would be particularly important if the world was to be close to a tipping point whose crossing increases the likelihood of a climatic catastrophe (Hepburn, 2006:232) . Crossing the tipping point becomes more likely as the time horizon of the climate protection agreement increases (Hepburn, 2006:238) .
The high degree of uncertainty with respect to the shapes of the marginal cost and benefit curves gives also rise to combining both price and quantity based approaches into socalled hybrid instruments, such as a trading system with a floor for certificate prices. Price floors would only prove effective in cases of low demand, as in such situations, the price floor prevents market prices from falling below a lower bound (Figure 6 ). Then, a price floor works like a tax whose rate equals the difference between the price floor and the hypothetical market price that would be observed in the absence of the price floor. In situations in which the price floor is binding, companies would invest in additional abatement measures, rather than purchasing more expensive allowances, leading to an excess supply ( ) of allowances ( Figure 6 ).Then, an independent institution, e.g. a so-called European Allowance Bank, would have to buy the excess supply ( ) to stabilize the trading scheme. In essence, a price floor thus causes a reduction of the emissions cap, something that could also be achieved by other measures, however, such as the permanent deletion of excess allowances.
Another hybrid instrument with which the uncertainty about allowance prices among market participants could be reduced is a price corridor (Koch et al., 2014:678) . A key property of price corridors is the definition of a ceiling price, which becomes relevant in situations characterized by high demand and high scarcity (demand curve in Figure 7 ). In such situations, as the allowance price cannot exceed the ceiling price, companies would not invest in additional abatement measures when the ceiling price is reached, but instead would purchase allowances. Because the originally fixed supply cannot meet demand, more allowances must be made available, e.g. by a European Allowance Bank. As a consequence, the definition of a ceiling price in trading schemes is equivalent to raising the emissions cap.
The tighter the price corridor in the trading scheme is defined, that is, the smaller the difference between the ceiling price and the price floor, the more it resembles a tax.
Conversely, a trading scheme with a price corridor resembles a pure trading system if the corridor is broad, so that the allowance price can fluctuate almost freely. In contrast, a price floor has the disadvantage that it increases the cost burden for companies during recessive periods, while the ceiling of a price corridor limits the dampening effect of high allowance prices in boom cycles. Another disadvantage of a price floor is that this instrument can be abused by politicians in order to generate revenues. In fact, it is precisely the desire for higher revenues that could result in a steady increase of the price floor.
This worry is all the more warranted, as the "appropriate" price for emissions is unknown and, hence, there is no natural upper limit for political interventions with respect to the price floor.
Similarly, the MSR may also be prone to political interventions that aim at raising its lower and upper limits to impact allowances prices and generate revenues. The resulting uncertainties from such discretionary interventions may negatively affect both the innovation behavior of firms and their GHG emission levels. In sum, as a general rule, it must be recognized that any intervention into the mechanism of the ETS entails uncertainties, most importantly about the future amount of allowances, which may have negative consequences for investments in emission abatement technologies.
Summary and Conclusions
Prices for emission allowances were notoriously low in recent years. This fact is frequently interpreted as a symptom of an insufficient functioning of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) and used as a justification for the necessity of reforming it. This argument, however, is questionable, as a low allowance price is not a sign that the trading scheme works imperfectly (Keohane, Wagner, 2013) . Rather, low prices may indicate that either the emissions cap has not been ambitiously enough (e.g. as the result of a sluggish economy) or that the abatement costs have turned out to be lower than expected.
Actually, both reasons apply to the past, so that at the end of 2013, the surplus allowances in the ETS amounted to more than 2.2 billion (Gibis et al., 2015:26) . The vast majority of this surplus has been attributed to offsets from international climate projects (Öko-Institut, 2013) . These offsets are supposed to enable companies to exploit cheap emission reduction potentials outside the European Union, thereby simultaneously facilitating technology transfer and stimulating economic growth abroad. Yet, as numerous dubious projects were supported in the past, since 2013, the amount of offsets was limited for each EU Member State to half of the emissions to be reduced between 2008 and 2020.
These measures, as well as postponing the auctioning of 900 million allowances from 2014-2016 to 2019 and 2020, however, did not lead to a reduction of the surplus and, hence, 14 the rise in allowance prices was commensurately low. Therefore, the European Commission recently decided to introduce a market stability reserve (MSR), a rule-based mechanism to steering the market volume of allowances with which it is hoped to stabilize allowance prices at a substantially higher level than currently observed. From the Commission's MSR proposal, though, significant price increases cannot be expected in the short run, most notably due to the foreseen late introduction in 2019. In addition, there are more general doubts about the effectiveness of this instrument: Koch et al. (2014:683) , for instance, criticize that the MSR is principally ineffective in establishing a politically desired price level because of the low impact of demand shocks on the allowance prices.
Based on our reflections in this article, we alternatively recommend retaining the trading scheme in its pure form, instead of supplementing it by a price floor or a MSR. Past mistakes, above all the generous issuing of offsets resulting from dubious international climate protection projects, should be corrected by a single intervention: deleting, rather than backloading, the 900 million allowances that are planned to be brought back to the market in 2019 and 2020. Irrevocably deleting this amount of allowances will certainly have stronger consequences than temporally storing them in a MSR. Moreover, if it is politically desired to further stabilize the price, the emissions cap could be reduced more strongly (Keohane, Wagner, 2013) than currently planned (2.2% per year) as of 2021, the start of the fourth trading phase.
